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ABSTRACT 
 
Unless it remains in the single market via membership of the EEA or is able otherwise to 
negotiate special access terms, after Brexit the UK will have to fall back on the third country 
provisions of EU financial services regulation. This paper examines the complexities of the 
current Union approach to the treatment of third countries and considers the likelihood of 
Brexit smoothing the progression towards a more unified EU system. The paper also 
considers what the evolution of the EU’s treatment of third countries is likely to mean for the 
UK as it seeks to negotiate continued access to the EU single market. Finally, the paper 
explores new opportunities for the UK to innovate in regulatory design without impairing 
equivalence or undermining its commitment at the international level to global regulatory 
convergence.  
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THE UK AS A THIRD COUNTRY ACTOR IN EU FINANCIAL SERVICES 
REGULATION
 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Brexit: an elusive concept 
 
After the vote to leave the EU Theresa May, the new British Prime Minister, told the world 
that “Brexit means Brexit”. This was a Delphic utterance.  There are several different 
versions of Brexit, ranging from “soft Brexit” whereby the UK ceases to be a Member State 
of the EU but continues to have access to the single market as a member of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) or under a bespoke arrangement, through to “hard Brexit” whereby 
the UK has no form of associate membership or other tailored trading relationship with the 
EU and relies on its membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as a basis for trade 
with the EU.1 In a period of uncertainty, to assume a hard Brexit provides a secure foundation 
for an analytical inquiry, since this is the outer boundary of the range of possibilities. The 
clarity provided by assuming the extreme case should be helpful in identifying areas where it 
would be in the UK’s interests to secure bespoke treatment as part of its exit negotiations.  
 
                                                     
1 HM Government, Alternatives to Membership: Possible Models for the United Kingdom Outside the European 
Union (March 2016). 
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To achieve hard Brexit internally would require a labour-intensive root and branch review of 
UK legislation to revise provisions that were dictated by the UK’s international treaty 
obligations as a member of the EU and to fill gaps in areas that were covered by directly-
applicable EU law. Financial services regulation would require particular attention because of 
the extent to which regulatory competence shifted to the EU level during the period of 
membership.2 One example of the difficult choices presented by hard Brexit is the 
geographical scope of the ring-fence for retail banking operations. Originally set as the EEA,3 
in a hard Brexit scenario the scope could be changed to the UK, though doing so would 
disrupt industry planning that is already underway4 and could re-ignite debate about the risk 
of trapped funding within retail banks because of a shortage of suitable assets.5  The Great 
Repeal Bill, whereby the British government proposes to transpose EU law into domestic law 
would function as a stopgap measure while the implications of a more selective approach are 
carefully weighed. 
 
                                                     
2 Niamh Moloney, ‘Resetting the Location of Regulatory and Supervisory Control over EU Financial Markets: 
Lessons from Five Years On’ (2013) 62 International and Comparative Quarterly 955. 
3 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Ring-fenced Bodies and Core Activities) Order 2014, SI 2014/ 
1960, art 2.  Background discussion: Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report: Recommendations 
(September 2011); HM Treasury and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Banking Reform: 
Delivering Stability and Supporting a Sustainable Economy (Cm 8356, June 2012);  HM Treasury and 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Banking Reform: A New Structure for Stability and Growth 
(Cm 8545, February 2013).  
4 Martin Arnold, ‘Banks Ask Regulators for Clarification on Ringfencing’, Financial Times (London 31 July 
2016) www.ft.com/content/3f3b8e82-5708-11e6-9f70-badea1b336d4 accessed 21 December 2016.   
5 Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report (n 3) 277. 
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Hard Brexit would also require the UK to engage in a fundamental rethink of its external 
relations with the EU. It is this external aspect of the UK’s situation in a hard Brexit scenario 
that is examined in this paper.  
 
2. The UK as a third country 
 
Hard Brexit would make the UK a third country for the purposes of EU financial services 
regulation. Having given up its status as a Member State, the UK would cease to benefit from 
EU Treaty freedoms and from principles of mutual sincere cooperation and no discrimination 
on grounds of nationality between Member States; in its dealings with the EU the UK would 
have to fall back onto the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) core 
principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment. Specific protections in EU financial 
services regulation from discrimination on grounds of location or currency would fall away.6 
As well as being outside negotiations on the design of EU financial regulation, the UK would 
no longer enjoy the standing afforded to Member States to bring actions before the Court of 
Justice of the EU,7  a status that it used, for example, to block the ECB’s attempt to impose a 
“location” policy to require clearing houses that settle large amounts of euro-denominated 
transactions to be based in the euro area.8  In the immediate aftermath of the vote to leave 
                                                     
6 e.g. Regulation (EU) No 1022/2103, [2013] OJ L287/5 (amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, [2010] OJ 
L331/12 (the EBA founding Regulation) which provides that no Member State should be discriminated against 
as a venue for financial services (recital 22). 
7 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), art 263.  
8 Case T-496/11United Kingdom v European Central Bank, judgment 4 March 2015 with respect to the ECB, 
Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework (July 2011) .  
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there were already reports of the location issue being re-opened within the EU;9 the ECB is 
likely now to make the case for an expanded competence in order to safeguard the euro area 
financial infrastructure, and may seek to withdraw from its liquidity swap line arrangements 
for clearing houses that were made with the Bank of England in order to enhance financial 
stability in relation to central clearing within the EU.10  There is the possibility of clearing 
houses becoming less of a policy concern in the longer term because of the advent of newer 
blockchain-derived technologies;11 but this cannot be assumed since the alternative of 
established clearing houses simply absorbing new technologies into their business models is 
also tenable. The UK will also lose the subtle (though nonetheless important) proximity 
benefits that flowed from being the host State of the European Banking Authority (EBA), 
which will have to relocate to within the EU.  
 
3. Third countries in EU financial regulation: a system in transition 
 
What would be the parameters for this new phase of economic diplomacy and regulatory 
engagement between the UK and the EU? Broadly speaking, EU financial regulation is 
                                                     
9 Jim Brunsden and Alex Barker, ‘City to be Sidelined by Capital Markets Union Plan’ Financial Times 
(London, 29 June 2016) www.ft.com/content/d8e0de94-3e11-11e6-8716-a4a71e8140b0 accessed 21 December 
2016. 
10 Angus Armstrong, ‘EU Membership, Financial Services and Stability’ (2016) 236 National Institute 
Economic Review 31, referring to ECB and Bank of England, Measures to enhance financial stability in relation 
to centrally cleared markets in the EU, Joint Press Release (29 March 2015) 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2015/044.pdf accessed 21 December 2016. 
11 John Dizard, ‘Clearing Houses Should not be a Bargaining Tool in Brexit Talks’ft.com (10 July 2016) 
www.ft.com/content/cddc7964-44f5-11e6-9b66-0712b3873ae1?sectionid=reports_exchanges-trading-clearing 
accessed 21 December 2016. 
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evolving towards a system in which third country banks, investment firms, infrastructure 
providers and other actors are able to provide diverse financial services and activities across 
the single market on the basis of compliance with their home regulatory and supervisory 
framework where (or to the extent that) the third country framework has been deemed by the 
European Commission to be equivalent to the Union framework and certain other conditions 
are satisfied, including, where necessary, the putting in place of cooperation arrangements 
between relevant supervisory authorities.  In this respect EU law is following a model 
familiar to international financial regulation.12 A finding of equivalence, supported by 
cooperation arrangements, makes it possible for authorities in different countries or regions to 
rely on each other; this avoids duplicative or conflicting rules, and closes gaps that could 
otherwise enable regulatory arbitrage or excessive risk-taking. The benefits that flow from 
concessions based around regime-equivalence are thus important not only to the business 
models of internationally-active financial actors but also to systemic stability.13 It is a rational 
choice for countries to cooperate to deal with problems that do not respect jurisdictional 
boundaries.14 From a business perspective, third country access based on equivalence can 
lead to significant efficiency gains by enabling streamlined organisation of an international 
                                                     
12 Dirk A Zetzsche, ‘Competitiveness of Financial Centers in Light of Financial and Tax Law Equivalence 
Requirements’ in Ross P Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas and Douglas W Arner (eds), Reconceptualising Global 
Finance and its Regulation (CUP 2016); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, ‘Mutual Recognition in International Finance’ 
(2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 55.  
13 Chris Brummer, Minilateralism: How Trade Alliances, Soft Law and Financial Engineering are Redefining 
Economic Statecraft (CUP 2014) ch 3.  
14 But multiple forces influence the design of international financial regulation and it is not simply the product 
of rational choice by countries:  Pierre-Hugues Verdier, ‘The Political Economy of International Financial 
Regulation (2013) 88 Indiana Law Journal 1405.  
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financial services group and avoiding the need to establish a host country presence 
(subsidiary or branch) to satisfy host State regulatory requirements. 
 
However, a unified Union approach to the treatment of third countries around the concept of 
equivalence and with a fixed role for the various actors is not yet in place. Equivalence 
solutions are not universally available. Important areas not covered include payment systems 
and settlement finality; legal uncertainty in these areas could threaten systemic stability. In 
some situations, the access that is available to a third country actor is limited to a Member 
State’s national market and there is no single point of entry to the entirety of the EU single 
market.  There is also variation in the extent to which the powers that remain vested in 
Member States to allow third country actors access to their national market only are subject 
to specific harmonized conditions. Where equivalence solutions do apply, different measures 
allocate different roles to the European Commission, European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs) and the national competent authorities in ways that are not always readily 
understandable as being driven by differences in the contextual setting. There is also a lack of 
uniformity with respect to whether reciprocity of treatment for EU actors under the third 
country regime is required as a condition of equivalence.15  
 
4. The design and approach of this paper 
 
Part II presents a more detailed picture of the complex world that awaits the UK and its 
financial service industry on a hard Brexit assumption by outlining the treatment of third 
countries in a number of key areas of EU financial regulation. Part III considers the reasons 
                                                     
15 But major measures that form the backbone of EU market regulation are robust in demanding reciprocity: 
e.g., MiFIR, recital 44 and art 47(1); EMIR recital 7 and art 25(6).   
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for this complexity and uses that analysis to predict the impact of Brexit on EU external 
relations. Part IV examines the implications of being a third country vis-à-vis the EU for the 
UK financial services industry and for UK financial regulatory policy. Part V summarises the 
findings and concludes. 
 
In looking forward, this study must inevitably engage with uncertainties and unknowns. 
However, this is not wholly uncharted territory and this study draws upon existing 
scholarship on the EU’s role in international financial regulation to develop an analytically-
grounded and informed view on the issues and risks that lie ahead.16 Legal, political and 
                                                     
16 Niamh Moloney, ‘The European Union in International Financial Governance’ (2017) Russell Sage 
Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences (forthcoming); Niamh Moloney, ‘International Financial Governance, 
The EU, and Brexit:  The “Agencification” of EU Financial Governance and the Implications’ (2016) 17 
European Business Organization Law Review 451; Alasdair R Young, ‘The European Union as a Global 
Regulator? Context and Comparison’ (2015) 22 Journal of European Public Policy 1233; Abraham L Newman 
and Elliot Posner, ‘Putting the EU in its Place: Policy Strategies and the Global Regulatory Context’ (2015) 22 
Journal of European Public Policy 1316;  Chad Damro, ‘Market Power Europe: Exploring a Dynamic 
Conceptual Framework’ (2015) 22 Journal of European Public Policy 1336; Lucia Quaglia, ‘The Politics of 
“Third Country Equivalence” in Post-Crisis Financial Services Regulation in the European Union’ (2015) 38 
West European Politics 167; Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd edn OUP 
2014); Lucia Quaglia, The European Union and Global Financial Regulation (OUP 2014); Hans-Jürgen 
Bieling, ‘Shattered Expectations: The Defeat of European Ambitions of Global Financial Reform’ (2014) 21 
Journal of European Public Policy 346; Daniel Mügge (ed) Europe and the Governance of Global Finance 
(OUP 2014); Daniel Mügge, ‘Europe's Regulatory Role in Post-crisis Global Finance’(2014) 21 Journal of 
European Public Policy 316; Elliot Posner and Nicholas Véron, ‘The EU and Financial Regulation: Power 
Without Purpose’ (2014) 17 Journal of European Public Policy 400; Lucia Quaglia, ‘The European Union, the 
USA and International Standard Setting by Regulatory Fora in Finance’ (2013) 19 New Political Economy 427; 
Eilís Ferran, ‘Crisis-driven Regulatory Reform’ in E Ferran, N Moloney, JG Hill and JC Coffee The Regulatory 
Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2012); Daniel Mügge, ‘The European Presence in Global 
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other social science literature has dived deep into the EU institutional and political dynamics 
and internal processes to understand the EU’s external influence on financial regulation. 
Scholars have considered how far the mixed external success is linked to uneven growth in 
internal EU regulatory capacity across the field of financial regulation and, in turn, the extent 
to which this unevenness can be traced back to the divergent regulatory preferences of the 
most economically powerful Member States, in particular the UK, Germany and France, and 
to competing interest group coalitions. Close examination of how the global regulatory 
context has influenced various strategies pursued by the EU in different situations (exporting 
home regulation, seeking to gain first mover advantage, forging mutual recognition and 
building coalitions) has resulted in an analytical framework that claims predictive power.17 
This body of work thus yields valuable pointers to a future in which British politics and the 
interests of the UK financial services industry are no longer deeply embedded inside EU 
internal processes.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Financial Governance: a Principal-Agent Perspective’ (2011) 18 Journal of European Public Policy 383; Pierre 
Schammo, ‘Equivalence-based Regulation and EU Prospectus Law - the Shadow Regime’ in  Daniel Prentice 
and Arad P Reisberg, Corporate Finance Law in the UK and the EU (OUP 2011); Elliot Posner, ‘Is a European 
Approach to Financial Regulation Emerging from the Crisis?’ in Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari and Hubert 
Zimmermann (eds), Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International Regulatory Change (Routledge 
2010); Eilís Ferran, ‘Capital Market Openness After Financial Turmoil’ in Panos Koutrakos and Malcolm Evans 
(eds), Beyond the Established Orders (Hart Publishing 2010); Andreas Dür, ‘Fortress Europe or Open Door 
Europe? The External Impact of the EU’s Single Market in Financial Services’ (2010) 18 Journal of European 
Public Policy 771; Elliot Posner, (2009) ‘Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Co-
operation at the Turn of the Millennium’ (2009) 63 International Organization 665; Eric J Pan, ‘A European 
Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets’ (2007) 2 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & 
Commercial Law 133. 
17 Newman and Posner, ibid; Damro, ibid. See also Stephen Woolcock, European Union Economic Diplomacy: 
The Role of the EU in External Economic Relations (Ashgate 2012).   
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PART II: THE TREATMENT OF THIRD COUNTRIES IN SELECTED AREAS OF EU 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
1. Banking and prudential supervision 
 
1.1. International banking groups 
 
EEA deposit-taking institutions (hereafter banks) are free to conduct their cross-border 
business in the Union by providing services or through branches or subsidiaries.18  A third 
country bank is in a different position because it must obtain permission whether to operate 
as a branch or as a subsidiary. The power to authorise branches of third-country banks to 
operate within the Union and to set the specific conditions under which they are allowed to 
operate remains with Member States.19 Subject to the safeguard that branches of third country 
banks must not be given more favourable treatment than that accorded to branches of an EU 
bank,20 Member State authorities (and the ECB within the Single Supervisory Mechanism for 
                                                     
18 CRD, art 33. 
19 For the UK approach: PRA, Supervising International Banks: The Prudential Regulation Authority’s 
Approach to Branch Supervision (SS10/14).   Within the euro area Single Supervisory Mechanism, national 
competent authorities remain responsible for the supervision of third country credit institutions establishing a 
branch or providing cross border banking services: Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 conferring specific 
tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions [2013] OJ L287/63, recital 28. The authorisation of a credit institution established as a subsidiary is 
a task conferred on the ECB: ibid, art 4.  
20 CRD, art 47. 
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the euro area) make their own determination whether a branch or subsidiary is the appropriate 
form. At present there is no specific equivalence requirement or process at EU level that 
applies to decisions about third country bank branching, nor are such decisions subject to 
specific harmonized conditions.21 Subsidiarization or not is a key decision because whilst 
from the business standpoint a branch is often the less costly option, from a financial stability 
perspective the establishment of a separately-capitalised subsidiary that is under local 
supervision (and resolution in the event of failure) is advantageous.22 Permission to a third 
country bank to conduct business via a branch does not confer single market passporting 
rights.23  
 
Formal EU equivalence tests do apply in certain other contexts relevant to international 
banking groups. First, equivalence can enable streamlined consolidated supervision of an EU 
bank that is part of an international banking group headquartered in a third country. Provided 
the third country regime for consolidated supervision is considered equivalent to the EU 
regime, the third country consolidated supervision regime can suffice; without equivalence, 
EU consolidated supervision requirements or other appropriate supervisory techniques which 
                                                     
21 CRD, recital 23 and art 47(3) envisage rules that accord parity of treatment to third country branches 
throughout the Union. For the future, note that in November 2016 the Commission published a legislative 
proposal that, if adopted, will oblige Member States to require an intermediate EU holding company where two 
or more institutions in the Union are part of the same large (threshold: EUR 30 billion or a non-EU G-SII) third 
country group: European Commission ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council  
amending Directive 2013/36/EU  as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial 
holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures’ 
COM(2016) 854. 
22 Jonathan Fiechter, İnci Ötker-Robe, Anna Ilyina, Michael Hsu, André Santos, A and Jay Surti,  Subsidiaries 
or Branches: Does One Size Fit All? (IMF SDN/11/04). 
23 CRD recital 23.   
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achieve the objectives of supervision on a consolidated basis will apply.24  Secondly, 
equivalence has a role in ensuring the cooperation between supervisors both within and 
outside colleges of supervisors that is essential for effective supervision of an international 
bank group. Supervisors need to be able freely to exchange information with each other 
secure in the knowledge that it will be treated with appropriate confidentiality and 
professional secrecy. These matters are also within the realm of formal EU equivalence 
examination: the conclusion of a cooperation agreement providing for the exchange of 
information with a third country’s authorities is subject to a guarantee that the third country’s 
professional secrecy requirements are at least equivalent to those in EU law;25 there must be 
equivalence with respect to confidentiality requirements in order for a third country authority 
to be admitted to participation in a college of supervisors.26 
 
1.2. The prudential treatment of EU institutions’ third country exposures 
 
Equivalence can unlock a favourable treatment for prudential purposes of certain categories 
of third country exposures.  The detailed prudential requirements applicable to EU banks and 
other institutions provide for equivalence determinations in a range of areas in order for the 
application of the same preferential treatment of third country exposures as applies to EU 
exposures.27 The equivalence determination is with respect to the prudential supervisory and 
regulatory requirements of the third country.  
 
                                                     
24 CRD, art 127. 
25 CRD, art 55.  
26 CRD, art 116(6).  
27 CRR, arts 107(3) and (4), 114(7), 115(4), 116(5), 132(3) and 142(2). 
14 
 
1.3. Procedural aspects of equivalence in the banking context 
 
Consolidated supervision:28 the competent authorities of the relevant Member States carry 
out the assessment of the equivalence of consolidated supervision for subsidiaries of third 
country groups. The Commission may request the European Banking Committee to give 
general guidance as to whether the consolidated supervision arrangements in third countries 
are likely to achieve the objectives of consolidated supervision. The European Banking 
Committee is composed of high-level representatives from Member States (mostly from 
ministries of finance). The ECB and the EBA attend as observers. The EBA is required to 
assist the Commission and the European Banking Committee. Competent authorities are 
required to take account of guidance from the European Banking Committee and are required 
to consult with the EBA before adopting a decision.  
 
Confidentiality and professional secrecy:29 CRD, article 116(6) provides that in order for a 
third country authority to participate in a college of supervisors, all of the competent 
authorities in the college must be of the opinion that the third country confidentiality 
requirements are equivalent.30 In this context the determination of equivalence does not 
involve the Commission. The EBA has issued recommendations on the equivalence of a 
number of third country confidentiality regimes to inform the opinions of the national 
competent authorities.31 These recommendations were issued on the basis of Article 16 of the 
EBA Regulation32 and, as such, competent authorities must comply or explain.  
                                                     
28 CRD, art 127. 
29 CRD, art 116(6) and art 55. 
30 CRD, art 116(6); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/99, [2015] OJ L21/21. 
31 EBA/REC/2015/01. 
32 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, [2010] OJ L/12. 
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The EBA recommendations do not formally extend to the CRD, article 55 decisions on 
equivalence with respect to professional secrecy that Member States must make ahead of 
entering into cooperation agreements with third country authorities.33  Nevertheless, 
equivalence assessments regimes performed for the purposes of article 116(6) can also  be  
useful  for  article  55.34    
 
Prudential treatment of third country exposures: in all of these cases the responsibility to 
determine equivalence now rests with the Commission, and decisions are made by way of 
implementing acts; prior to 1 January 2015 it lay with national competent authorities. The 
EBA does not have a formal legislative mandate to assist the process but in practice it is 
asked by the Commission to work on assessments.35  
 
1.4. Dissatisfaction with procedural aspects of equivalence in banking  
 
The equivalence assessment processes in banking have been singled out by the EBA as an 
area in need of improvement.36 With respect to consolidated supervision (CRD, article 127) it 
has recommended that it should be for the Commission, assisted by the EBA, to issue 
implementing decisions on equivalence. This would move the process towards the emerging 
                                                     
33 CRD, art 55.  
34 EBA, Opinion on Cooperation with Third Countries (EBA/Op/2015/19) para 13. 
35 Ibid, paras 15-16.  EBA (in common with the other ESAs) is empowered by its founding Regulation to assist 
in preparing equivalence assessments: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, art 33(1).  
36 EBA, Opinion (n 34).  
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“standard” EU equivalence model.37  As regards its own position, the EBA has called for 
explicit mandates to assist the Commission and to issue recommendations.  
 
2. Cross-border investment services  
 
2.1. Services to retail clients 
 
There is no cross-border passport available to a third country firm that wants to provide 
investment services to retail clients (or clients who are elective (“opted up”) professional 
clients by virtue of their experience and expertise). The position under MiFIDII (applicable 
from January 2018) remains that access is on a State-by-State basis.38  Subject to the usual 
safeguard that third country firms must not be treated more favourably than EU firms, 
Member States can retain exemptions in their national law that permit third country firms that 
do not have a branch in the Member State to provide investment services without local 
authorisation. UK law provides a generous exemption in favour of overseas persons39, but 
there is a variable degree of openness across the Member States with respect to the provision 
of cross-border investment services by third country firms without a local authorisation.40  
                                                     
37 As well as examples considered in this study, this model has been adopted for insurance purposes in the 
Solvency II Directive: EIOPA, Equivalence https://eiopa.europa.eu/external-relations/equivalence  
accessed 21 December 2016. At the very detailed level of the form of the EU legal instrument used for 
equivalence decisions, depending on context delegated or implementing acts are specified.  
38 MiFIDII, arts 39-43. 
39 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, SI 2001/544, art 72 exemption 
for overseas persons. 
40 MIFIR, recital 41 (“The provision of services by third-country firms in the Union is subject to national 
regimes and requirements. Those regimes are highly differentiated …”). 
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Where, however, a Member State chooses to require a third country firm to establish a 
branch, under MiFIDII there is an authorisation process to which a number of EU 
harmonized conditions apply. These conditions, which are not as stringent as a full 
equivalence-based examination, are that: the provision of services for which the firm requests 
authorisation in question is subject to authorisation and supervision in the third country; the 
requesting firm is properly authorised in the third country; due regard is paid to FATF 
recommendations relating to anti-money-laundering and terrorism financing; cooperation 
agreements are in place between the Member State and third country authorities; the branch 
has sufficient initial capital at its disposal; persons are appointed to manage the branch in 
compliance with EU requirements with respect to management bodies; there is an OECD 
Model compliant tax cooperation agreement in place between the Member State and the third 
country; and the firm belongs to an authorised or recognised investor compensation regime. 
On an ongoing basis, a third country branch must comply with certain MiFIDII obligations 
and is subject to the supervision of the Member State’s competent authority; but the Member 
State must not impose any additional requirements on the organisation and operation of the 
branch in respect of the matters  covered by MiFIDII.  
 
2.2. Services to eligible counterparties and professional clients 
 
Under MiFIR (also fully applicable from January 2018) a third country firm is able to provide 
investment services or perform investment activities to eligible counterparties and 
professional clients across the single market and without the establishment of a branch where 
it is registered in the register of third country firms kept by the European Securities and 
18 
 
Markets Authority (ESMA).41 Whilst ESMA can withdraw registration where it has well-
founded reasons to do so, it does not assume responsibility to supervise registered third 
country firms.42  Entry onto the ESMA register is subject to three conditions: an equivalence 
determination by the Commission with respect to the third country’s legal and supervisory 
arrangements; the firm being authorised in the jurisdiction of its head office to provide the 
investment  services or activities to be provided in the Union and being subject to effective 
supervision and enforcement ensuring full compliance with the  requirements applicable in 
that third country; and there being cooperation arrangements in place with the third country 
authorities.43  Subject to a transitional arrangement,44 once there is an equivalence 
determination by the Commission with respect to a third country (and provided it remains in 
effect) Member States will no longer be able to allow that third country’s firms to provide 
investment services or activities to eligible counterparties and professional in accordance 
with  national regimes.45  
 
An equivalence decision by the Commission for this purpose is required to state that the  
legal  and  supervisory  arrangements  of  the third  country  ensure  that  firms authorised in 
that third country comply with legally binding prudential and business conduct requirements 
which have equivalent effect to the requirements set out in MiFIR, MiFIDII and CRD and 
associated delegated and implementing measures. It must also confirm reciprocity of 
treatment for EU firms under the third country legal regime. To arrive at the determination, 
the Commission must establish by reference to the prudential and business conduct 
                                                     
41 MiFIR, arts 46-49 and art 54. 
42 MiFIR, art 49. 
43 MiFIR, art 46(2). 
44 MiFIR, art 54. 
45 MiFIR, art 46(4). 
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framework of the  third country that firms providing investment services and activities in that 
third country are: (a) subject to authorisation and to effective supervision and enforcement on 
an  ongoing basis; (b) subject to sufficient capital requirements and appropriate requirements 
applicable to shareholders and members of their management body; (c) subject to adequate 
organisational requirements in the area of internal control functions; and (d) subject to 
appropriate conduct of business rules. The third country framework must also ensure market 
transparency and integrity by preventing market abuse in the form of insider dealing and 
market manipulation. The Commission’s decision on equivalence is subject to oversight by 
the European Securities Committee (a body comprised of representatives of Member 
States).46 The Commission will look to ESMA as a source of technical advice.  
 
Where a third country firm has established a branch in an EU Member State and its home 
country has been judged to be equivalent, it is then able to provide on a cross-border basis the 
services and activities covered under the authorisation to eligible counterparties and 
professional clients without the establishment of new branches.47   
 
3. Credit rating agencies 
 
EU law restricts the use of ratings issued by third country rating agencies for EU regulatory 
purposes.48 There are two routes whereby third country ratings can be used, the first being an 
“endorsement” regime and the latter a “certification” regime based on equivalence.   The 
                                                     
46 MiFIR, art 47 and art 51. 
47 MiFIR, art 47 (3). 
48 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16  
September 2009 on credit rating agencies [2009] L302/1 (as amended), arts 4–5.  
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endorsement route allows a rating agency registered with ESMA (the single supervisor for 
rating agencies in the EU) which is part of the same group as a third country rating agency to 
endorse for EU regulatory purposes a rating issued by the third country agency. The 
endorsement process is subject to a number of conditions including that the EU credit rating 
agency has verified and is able to demonstrate on an ongoing basis to ESMA that the conduct 
of credit rating activities by its associated third-country credit rating agency fulfils 
requirements which are at least “as stringent as” requirements applicable to EU credit rating 
agencies, and that it is subject to effective supervision. The “as stringent” standard is similar 
to the required standard for equivalence and must be satisfied by reference to third country 
measures that are legally binding.49 The reference to “legally binding” measures was initially 
controversial because the EU was ahead of other jurisdictions in shifting away from non-
binding self-regulation of credit rating agencies. However, other major economies have since 
joined the trend towards public regulation of credit rating agencies and concerns as to the 
practical utility of the endorsement route have receded. Jurisdictions that have passed the 
ESMA “as stringent” test include the United States, Australia, Japan, Canada, Singapore and 
Hong Kong.  
 
The certification route is available to third country credit rating agencies that have no 
presence or affiliation in the EU provided they are not systemically important for the 
financial stability or integrity of the financial markets of one or more Member States. The 
certification route for, in effect smaller rating agencies that do not have a global presence, is 
subject to a determination of third country equivalence by the Commission, overseen by the 
European Securities Committee. The requirements are that credit rating agencies in that third 
                                                     
49 ESMA, Guidelines on the application of the endorsement regime under Article 4(3) of the Credit Rating 
Agencies Regulation No 1060/2009, 12-19.  
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country are subject to: authorisation or registration; effective supervision and enforcement on 
an ongoing basis; and legally binding rules which are equivalent to the EU requirements for 
rating agencies (subject to certain exceptions and exemptions).  In addition, ratings must be 
shielded from interference by supervisors and other public authorities of the third country. 
Reciprocity of treatment is not mandated. ESMA provides technical assistance to the 
Commission in these equivalence assessments.50  
 
4. Benchmarks 
 
Regulation of benchmarks is a new area that has followed in the wake of benchmark 
manipulation scandals. The EU regime, which is broad in scope, bears some similarity to its 
approach in relation to rating agencies so far as third countries are concerned. Under the EU 
Benchmark Regulation,51 benchmarks produced by non-EU administrators can only be used 
in the EU where the administrator is authorised or registered under an equivalent third 
country regime or the benchmark is endorsed by an EU administrator.52 As an interim 
measure pending an equivalence decision, a non-EU benchmark can be used where the 
administrator is recognised by a Member State competent authority.53  
 
                                                     
50 ESMA, Non-EU Credit Rating Agencies, www.esma.europa.eu/supervision/non-eu-credit-rating-agencies 
accessed 21 December 2016. 
51 Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on indices used as 
benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds 
and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU and Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, [2016] OJ L 171/1. 
52 Regulation (EU) 2016/1011, arts 30-31 and art 33. 
53 Regulation (EU) 2016/1011, art 32. 
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The equivalence determination by the Commission relates to binding requirements in the 
third country that correspond to the EU Benchmark Regulation, taking account in particular 
of whether the legal framework and supervisory practice of the third country ensure 
compliance with relevant IOSCO principles. Effective on-going and supervision must also be 
in place. The Commission’s implementing decision, which is overseen by the European 
Securities Committee, may relate to all of a third country’s administrators or may be confined 
to specific administrators, or specific benchmarks or families of benchmarks. ESMA will 
provide technical assistance in the process. ESMA is also responsible for establishing 
cooperation arrangements with the third country supervisor. The possibility of a partial 
equivalence determination (of specific administrators, benchmarks or families of 
benchmarks) is a concession to the international state of play; some jurisdictions have chosen 
to regulate only a limited number of critical benchmarks whereas the EU approach is more 
comprehensive.   
 
The endorsement route allows an EU authorised or registered administrator, or other 
supervised entity located in the Union with a clear and well-defined role within the control or 
accountability framework of a third country administrator, which is able to monitor 
effectively the provision of a benchmark, to apply to a Member State competent authority to 
endorse a third country benchmark or family of benchmarks for Union use.54 One of the 
conditions to endorsement is that the provision of the benchmark (or family) fulfils on an on-
going basis requirements that are at least as stringent as the EU requirements on 
benchmarking. There must also be an objective reason to provide the benchmark or family of 
benchmarks in the third country and for that benchmark or family to be endorsed. The 
Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts, which are overseen by the European 
                                                     
54 Regulation (EU) 2016/1011, art 33. 
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Parliament and by the Council, to determine the conditions within which competent 
authorities may assess whether there is an objective reason. An important departure from the 
position in relation to rating agencies is that for the purposes of the “as stringent” test self-
regulatory, as well as mandatory, requirements count. This feature reflects the fact that the 
EU’s decision to impose mandatory requirements is not (yet) widely replicated elsewhere; to 
insist on comparability of mandatory requirements would have defeated the purpose of 
providing the endorsement route as an alternative to the equivalence regime, which is widely 
thought to be unworkable in practical terms. The possibility of partial endorsement also caters 
for differences in approach between the EU and other jurisdictions.  
 
The stopgap recognition procedure depends on the third country administrator acquiring 
recognition by its Member State of reference, which is determined on the basis of criteria set 
out in the Benchmark Regulation.55 The administrator must comply with the EU Benchmark 
Regulation (save for certain provisions) or with relevant IOSCO principles provided the 
application of such principles is equivalent to compliance with the applicable terms of the 
Benchmark Regulation. In this case equivalence is to be verified by an independent external 
auditor in the case of a non-supervised administrator, or the third country national competent 
authority in the case of a supervised administrator. The conditions applicable to the 
recognition route also include the administrator appointing a legal representative in the 
Member State of reference to assume oversight functions and to be accountable to the 
Member State’s competent authority.  
 
There is concern that the three routes and the concessions built into them in recognition of 
differences in approach elsewhere do not do enough to ensure that non-EU benchmarks will 
                                                     
55 Regulation (EU) 2016/1011, art 32. 
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still be available to EU firms.56  Whilst similar concerns were expressed about the impact of 
EU regime for credit rating agencies on non-EU agencies and the more gloomy predictions 
did not come true, benchmark administrators and rating agencies have different business 
models and the incentives for benchmark administrators to maintain EU eligibility may be 
weaker.  
 
5. Market infrastructure providers  
 
Market infrastructure providers include trading platforms, clearing houses (also known as 
central counterparties (CCPs)) and information-gathering trade repositories. In a hard Brexit 
scenario, UK market infrastructure providers will lose the regulatory status (e.g. being a 
“regulated market” for purposes associated with the admission of securities to listing) and 
associated entitlements they enjoyed under EU law. Important EU legal protections with 
respect to the operation of payment systems and settlement finality will cease to apply. This 
loss is mitigated to a limited extent by equivalence-based provisions in MiFIR and EMIR to 
allow, amongst other things, third country infrastructure providers to be eligible as trading 
and/or clearing venues for mandatory EU trading/settlement obligations, and to access on a 
non-discriminatory basis trading venues and CCPs established in the Union. The position 
with respect to CCPs under EMIR can be taken as an illustrative example.57 The EMIR CCP 
                                                     
56 Clifford Chance, The New EU Benchmarks Regulation: What You Need to Know (9 May 2016) 
www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2016/09/the_new_eu_benchmarksregulationwhatyounee.html  
accessed 21 December 2016 Morrison Foerster, Setting the New Benchmark: EU Regulation on Financial 
Benchmarks (13 June 2016) https://media2.mofo.com/documents/160613eufinancialbenchmarks.pdf accessed 
21 December 2016. 
57 The EMIR CCP equivalence process is broadly typical of the regulatory approach in this area, but even here 
the EU legislators have not been completely consistent. See, e.g., MiFIR, art 23(1) on trading obligations for 
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regime is a good example of the direction of travel for the Union’s unified approach to third 
country equivalence.  
 
ESMA is directly responsible for recognising central counterparties (CCPs) established in 
third countries to allow them to provide clearing services within the Union.58 Recognition 
allows counterparties that are subject to the EMIR clearing obligation to use the third country 
CCP for that purpose.59 An equivalence determination by the Commission is one of the 
conditions to which recognition is subject.60 The determination of equivalence by the 
Commission takes the form of an implementing act overseen by the European Securities 
Committee. The Commission is required to determine that the legal and supervisory 
arrangements of the third country ensure that CCPs authorised in that third country comply 
with legally binding requirements which are equivalent to  requirements laid down in the 
EMIR, that those CCPs are subject to effective supervision and enforcement in that third 
country on an ongoing basis, and also that the legal framework of that third country provides 
for an effective equivalent system for the recognition of CCPs authorised under third-country 
legal regimes.61 In addition, ESMA must also be satisfied that the CCP is established or 
authorised in a third country that is considered to have equivalent systems for anti-money-
laundering and combatting the financing of terrorism to those of the Union.62  In furtherance 
                                                                                                                                                                     
investment firms which includes a third country trading venue as an eligible venue provided it has been assessed 
as equivalent in accordance with the process under the 2003 Prospectus Directive, which is different from the 
EMIR CCP framework.   
58 EMIR, art 25.  
59 EMIR, art 4(5). 
60 EMIR, art 25(6). 
61 EMIR, art 25(6).  
62 EMIR, art 25(2). 
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of the aim of ensuring that recognised  third country CCPs do not disrupt the  orderly   
functioning   of   Union   markets, the  information  provided to ESMA concerning  the  
recognition  of  a third country CCP should enable ESMA to assess whether that CCP is   in  
full  compliance  with  the  applicable third country prudential requirements.63   
 
6. Funds and fund managers 
 
UCITS (undertakings for the collective investment in transferable securities) account for 
around 75 per cent of all collective investments by small investors in Europe. To qualify for 
the UCITS designation, the fund must be EU-based and it must be managed by an EU-based 
management company.64  In a hard Brexit scenario, UK fund managers will no longer be able 
to manage UCITS directly (but may still be able to act as a delegated manager). UK funds 
will not be able to use the EU UCITS brand but may instead be within the scope of the 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD). Hard Brexit will also exclude 
UK funds and fund managers from other EU fund brands that can be marketed to eligible 
investors across the Union: ELTIFs (European long term investment funds);65 EuVECA 
(European venture capital funds);66 and EuSEF (European Social Entrepreneurship Funds).67  
                                                     
63 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013, [2013] OJ L52/51, recital 5.  
64 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable 
securities (UCITS) [2009] OJ L302/32 (amended by Directive 2014/91/EU), art 1 and arts 5-6. 
65 Regulation (EU) 2015/760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 April 2015 [2015] OJ 
L123/98, art 3(2) and art 5(2). 
66 Regulation (EU) No 345/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 
on European venture capital funds [2013] OJ L 115/1, art 2(1)(b) and art 3(a)(iii) (subject to review: art 
26(1)(h)). 
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Post Brexit the UK asset management industry will need to look to the AIFMD, which 
provides a framework for the pan-European marketing and management of alternative 
investment funds to professional investors. (Marketing to retail investors remains under 
Member State control subject to Union transparency requirements. 68) EU fund managers 
have a full passport (subject to notification requirements) to market and manage EU funds. 
However, the position with respect to third country funds and/or third country fund managers 
is notoriously complex.69 The Directive contains two third country regimes, one conferring a 
Union passport and the other enabling private placements within a Member State but not 
cross-border; the former is to be switched on at a future date and the latter is expected to be 
phased out after a period when the two regimes operate in tandem.70  
 
Even after its staged introduction, the passport for third country funds and fund managers will 
still be subject to stringent conditions. Where both the fund and the fund manager are based 
in third countries these conditions are: the fund manager must obtain authorisation by a 
Member State “of reference;”71 the fund manager must comply with AIFMD requirements 
save where compliance is not compatible with applicable third country national laws and 
provided there is actual compliance with an equivalent rule under the foreign law; the laws 
                                                                                                                                                                     
67 Regulation  (EU)  No  346/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council of  17  April  2013 on  
European  social  entrepreneurship  funds [2013] OJ L115/18, art 2(1)(b) and art 3(1)(iii) (subject to review: art 
27(1)(f)).  
68 AIFMD, art 43. 
69 Eilís Ferran, ‘After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity in the EU’ (2011) 12 
European Business Organization Law Review 379. 
70 AIFMD, arts 34 – 42 and arts 67 - 68. 
71 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 448/2013 [2013] OJ L132/3. 
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and supervisory system of the third country in which the manager is based must not prevent 
the effective exercise of supervisory functions under AIFMD; the manager must appoint a 
legal representative in the EU; appropriate cooperation arrangements must be in place 
between the authorities in reference Member State and the relevant third countries; the 
reference Member State’s law and jurisdiction are to govern disputes; there must be an 
OECD-compliant tax convention in place between reference MS and the third countries; and 
the third countries must not be on the FATF list of uncooperative jurisdictions with respect to 
money laundering and terrorist financing. There are supervisory notification requirements in 
respect of marketing intentions.72  A variant set of the passport conditions apply where the 
manager is based in the third country but the fund is not, or vice versa. A key point to note 
with regard to these conditions is that, passport notwithstanding, a third country fund 
manager must still comply with the AIFMD requirements (except for specific cases of 
incompatibility with the third country national law); it is not permitted to operate generally on 
the basis of “equivalent” third country laws.  
 
The “switching on” process for third countries depends on ESMA delivering an opinion on 
the operation of the passport for EU managers and funds and on the operation of national 
private placement regimes, and advice on the extension of the passport to third countries.73 
ESMA must give positive advice where it considers that there are no significant obstacles 
regarding investor protection, market disruption, competition and the monitoring of systemic 
                                                     
72 AIFMD, art 37. 
73 AIFMD, art 67. 
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risk, impeding the extension of the passport.74 The actual flicking of the switch is the 
responsibility of the Commission.75  
 
ESMA is conducting a country-by-country assessment of the potential extension of the 
AIFMD passport.76  At the time of writing (August 2016), it had examined twelve countries 
and given an unqualified or only moderately qualified opinion on most of them (including the 
United States, Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore), but it deferred its decision on Bermuda 
and the Cayman Islands because both countries were in the process of implementing new 
regulatory regimes; in addition, it noted that the assessment could not be completed for the 
Isle of Man because of the absence of an AIFMD-like regime. ESMA’s verification criteria 
for this exercise included the operation of existing supervisory cooperation arrangements 
with the third country, the third country’s record in dealing with investor complaints, whether 
there was tangible evidence of adequate surveillance of market developments with a view to 
tracking systemic risks by the third country supervisory authority, and the possible 
implications of an extension for investor choice and market competition. ESMA considered 
how the relevant third country rules on investor protection measured up against those in the 
AIFMD and also how the regulatory regime in the third country measured up against relevant 
IOSCO principles. Whilst this was not a formal “equivalence” assessment, ESMA noted that 
“it is nevertheless relevant and necessary to investigate the extent to which the regulatory 
                                                     
74 AIFMD, art 67(4). 
75 AIFMD, art 67(6). 
76 ESMA, Advice to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the application of the 
AIFMD passport to non-EU AIFMs and AIFs (ESMA/2016/1140); ESMA, Advice to the European Parliament, 
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framework of the non-EU country differs from the AIFMD”.77 The dialogue between the 
Commission and ESMA on this exercise included a call from the Commission for a more 
detailed assessment of the capacity of supervisory authorities and their track record in 
ensuring effective enforcement.78 This exchange substantiates the point that equivalence 
(loosely interpreted) depends as much on  the practical reality of regulation (supervision and 
enforcement) as it does on what is said on paper.  
 
The AIFMD also imposes conditions on Member States’ national private placement regimes 
for third country actors, namely that the manager must comply with AIFMD transparency and 
disclosure requirements, there must be cooperation arrangements in place between relevant 
supervisory authorities, and the third country in which the manager/fund is based must not be 
on the FATF list of uncooperative jurisdictions. Member States can impose their own stricter 
marketing requirements.79  
 
 
PART III: WHY IS THE TREATMENT OF THIRD COUNTRIES SO COMPLICATED? 
 
Part of the explanation for this complicated state of affairs is that it reflects necessary 
bespoke tailoring to fit specific situations. The recent example of the framework for non-EU 
benchmarks illustrates: the treatment of third countries is complex, but for good reason. The 
EU has adopted a more comprehensive legislative regime for benchmark regulation than the 
                                                     
77 ESMA/2015/1236, para 20; ESMA/2016/1140, para 21. 
78 European Commission letter to ESMA on the AIFMD passport, 17 December 2015, at 
www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-publishes-letter-european-commission-aifmd-passport 
accessed 21 December 2016. 
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rest of the world thereby creating a situation in which a third country regime rigidly tied to 
the concept of equivalence by reference to legally-binding requirements would have been 
unworkable; other alternatives were needed to maintain access to a range of benchmarks to 
ensure the efficient functioning of the financial system.80 But at least some of the complexity 
can be viewed as a microcosm of the lack of coherence and consistency in EU financial 
services regulation in general, a problem that was exacerbated during the post-crisis period by 
the high political saliency of the issues and the resulting intense pressure on the law-making 
machinery.  Stories behind the hotchpotch of arrangements for third country actors include 
hard-fought battles around sharply-divided views on whether a unified EU approach would 
lead to more or less protectionism, power plays at multiple levels, and initial uncertainties 
within the EU institutions with respect to the appropriate distribution of responsibilities 
between Commission and the newly-established ESAs. The especially convoluted AIFMD 
framework is held out in the academic literature as a notorious example of a compromise 
solution to bridge a gulf between France and Germany on the one hand, and the UK on the 
other with respect to the openness of the EU to the international hedge fund industry.81  The 
fragmented way in which the EU institutions conduct legislative work is also a relevant factor 
because a silo-based approach is not conducive to achieving a consistent approach on 
horizontal issues that are common to a range of measures.82 A former Chair of the European 
Parliament’s influential Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee has spoken of third 
country issues being relegated to the end of negotiations and of the risk of “rubbish 
                                                     
80 ECON Report on the on the proposal for a regulation on indices used as benchmark (A8-0131/2015) 
(Rapporteur: Cora van Nieuwenhuizen) 75.  
81 Lucia Quaglia, ‘The Politics of “Third Country Equivalence”’ (n 16) 175-177. 
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compromises”.83 Another consideration is that thinking on the treatment of third countries in 
EU financial regulation has evolved over the years making it inevitable that some older 
measures will lag behind.84   
 
The process of evolution is set to continue as a result of both general stocktakes and reviews 
of EU financial regulation as well as periodic reviews of specific measures.85  The European 
Parliament has called for an evolution towards “a consistent and coherent system of sensible 
recognition of each other’s equal or similar standards”.86  The Commission has noted that 
“[t]he system based on the concept of equivalence has been significantly refined in recent 
years, and should be further improved in the future”.87  As noted in Part II, the EBA has 
                                                     
83 Sharon Bowles quoted in European Union  Committee, The Post-crisis EU Financial Regulatory Framework: 
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identified specific areas of banking regulation where more clarity is needed in the 
equivalence assessment processes.88  
 
Brexit is likely to smooth the progression towards a more unified system for the treatment of 
third countries.  To substantiate this claim, it is useful here to draw on Lucia Quaglia’s 
explanation of EU third country rules in financial regulation as being the product of strategic 
framing by the European Commission to facilitate agreement between Member State 
coalitions. 89 There may be less pressure on the Commission to broker difficult internal 
compromises on the treatment of third countries that satisfy both the more “closed” 
economies, such as Germany and France, and the more “open” economies once the UK, the 
lead member of the “open” camp, is out of the picture. By similar reasoning however, a post-
Brexit streamlined Union system for third countries that offers a more comprehensive single 
point of entry to the EU could be susceptible to protectionist tendencies in the way that it 
operates. There is a known risk of a post-Brexit inward turn across EU policy making in 
general.90 However, there are three powerful considerations that significantly reduce the 
chances of this risk becoming a reality in the area of financial services.  
 
First, the prospect of negative macroeconomic effects resulting from protectionism should 
discourage extremism. The EU economy continues to struggle, and the flagship capital 
markets union project is predicated on a need to facilitate the access of the corporate sector 
and of investors to a broader range of funding sources and investment opportunities in order 
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to support jobs and growth.91 This aim is unlikely to be furthered by building “fortress 
Europe” from which UK (and other third country) finance and investments are excluded and 
which, surely, would provoke tit-for-tat actions against European financial firms that seek to 
conduct cross-border business. The strength of the EU’s economic self-interest in remaining 
an internationally open financial market can thus be expected to remain a key variable in its 
dealings with third countries in general, and the UK in particular.  
 
Secondly, a post-Brexit inward turn would cross directly across the EU’s established 
financial services political agenda at the international level. EU financial regulation 
framework is now rich with declarations and requirements that express the Union’s deep 
commitment to the G20 agenda, to playing a central role in worldwide financial markets, to 
basing its regulatory choices around international standards, to working cooperatively with 
other countries to find mutually supportive, non-overlapping solutions, and to being open for 
international business.92  This is not lip-service: the EU political institutions have had the aim 
of strengthening European influence on global finance in their sights for many years93 
(though evaluations differ on how successful efforts to export the EU version of financial 
regulation have been94). Self-interest in international cooperation to contain the risk of 
systemic harm reinforces this commitment.  
                                                     
91 European Commission, ‘Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union’ COM(2015) 468. 
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The third consideration is the growing capacity of the technocratic ESAs in the equivalence 
sphere, to which Niamh Moloney has drawn attention.95 As largely apolitical organisations, 
their involvement in equivalence processes should help to shield determinations on specific 
matters from politically-driven distortions. (Although, as Moloney notes, consideration of 
how the ESAs themselves will adjust to the withdrawal of the UK, how, in particular, the 
ECB-EBA relationship will evolve post-Brexit, and how all of this will impact on EU 
relations with third countries quickly becomes quite speculative.)  
 
 
PART IV: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK? 
 
 
 
1. The UK’s interest in a more unified EU system for the treatment of third countries 
                                                                                                                                                                     
‘Crisis-driven Regulatory Reform (n 16) 104-107; Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets 
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The UK is implicated in the complicated arrangements that currently govern third country 
access to the EU. Its strong interest in maintaining the openness of London as an international 
financial centre dictated a case-by-case stance in legislative negotiations with respect to the 
adoption of EU-led equivalence as the conceptual basis for third country access. Fear that an 
equivalence determination at European level could prove to be too high a standard for others 
to meet meant that, on occasion, the UK was among those pressing hard for certain matters to 
remain outside the emerging EU equivalence-led approach to third countries and/or for 
alternative arrangements to be put in place as well. Non-standard arrangements that were in 
accordance with UK preferences include the retention of national regimes for the provision of 
retail financial services, the endorsement routes for third country rating agencies and 
benchmark administrators, and the staged approach to the introduction of the AIFMD 
passport accompanied by the retention of national private placement regimes.96  
 
The complications of the EU’s current approach to third countries take on a different 
complexion as the UK transitions to being a third country itself.  Since not all financial 
services and activities are covered by an EU single point of entry passport in favour of third 
countries, should the UK fail to negotiate special exit terms, to continue some activities UK 
actors with EU operations would have to absorb the costs of navigating variable exemptions 
under Member States’ national laws and/or restructuring their corporate group to establish an 
EU-based entity that comes under the umbrella of Union regulation and supervision. 
International businesses that until now have used the UK as their EU entry point would also 
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need to consider alternatives. Part III of this study identified as a likely prospect a more 
streamlined EU approach to third countries. Paradoxically, having been reluctant as a 
Member State to submit to a unified EU system for the treatment of third country, in a hard 
Brexit scenario the UK may come to welcome an accelerated shift by the EU towards 
precisely such a system, provided it does not become a vehicle for protectionist policies.  
 
2. Taking back control of regulation … but remaining equivalent  
  
Equivalence determinations (or similar exercises such as that being conducted by ESMA 
under the AIFMD) with respect to UK financial services regulation and supervision at the 
time of exit from the EU should be relatively straightforward exercises provided the UK’s 
financial services regulatory and supervisory framework remains largely unchanged at that 
point.  Assuming this to be the case, the UK will be strongly in the running to be the first 
country that passes the EU equivalence test in all the contexts in which it comes to be asked. 
 
If the UK were to embark quickly on extensive reform of its domestic financial regulation to 
strip out elements that were required by EU law but not in line with its domestic preferences 
(the proverbial “bonfire of the regulations” that featured in some of the pro-Brexit 
campaigning as an aspect of taking back control), this action could put equivalence in doubt. 
Whereas experience so far has been built up around “ordinary” third countries and the key 
issue has been whether the systems have converged sufficiently to be considered equivalent, 
in the case of the UK as a departing State third country, the question would be whether it 
remains equivalent in spite of the extent to which its system has started to diverge from that 
of the EU. Doubt, uncertainty and delay around resolution of that question would be 
anathema to business efficiency and could have adverse systemic repercussions.   
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The landmark EU-US deal on equivalence with respect to CCPs took over three years to 
conclude.97 Evaluations with respect to the AIFMD third country provisions have also been 
delayed.98 Not all determinations have been quite so difficult; the growing body of decisions 
on equivalence provides reassurance as to the sophistication of the process; the focus on 
substantive outcomes in practice as well as on paper has gone some way to allay fears that 
blockages would be caused by undue attention to differences in line-by-line detail, or that 
technical discussions would be derailed by politics. The UK would have the advantage of 
having been in close alignment with the EU and as such could expect some aspects of the 
process to move quickly. But it would also have the disadvantage of being in the position of 
seeking to destabilise the status quo whilst, at the same time, being under pressure from the 
major industry players of the City of London to maintain with as little disruption as possible 
the mutual market access that they consider key to the post-Brexit success of UK financial 
and related professional services.99 The reopening of old controversies (for example on 
bankers’ bonuses) would run the risk of being viewed as a deliberately provocative act. On 
pragmatic grounds this is a risk that the UK does not need to take given that whilst it did not 
                                                     
97 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/377 of 15 March 2016 on the equivalence of the regulatory 
framework of the United States of America for central counterparties that are authorised and supervised by the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission to the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council [2016] OJ/l70 32. On 16 December 2016, the European Commission has 
determined that India, Brazil, New Zealand, Japan Commodities, United Arab Emirates and Dubai International 
Financial Centre have the equivalent regulatory regimes for central counterparties (CCPs) as the European 
Union. 
98 ESMA, Advice (n 76). 
99 TheCityUK, UK Financial and Related Professional Services: Meeting the challenges and delivering 
opportunities (London, August 2016) www.thecityuk.com/research/uk-frps-challenges-and-opportunities/ 
accessed 21 December 2016. 
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always get its way, broadly speaking the system of EU financial regulation that the UK is 
leaving behind is one that reflects and suits British interests. Furthermore, staying close to the 
EU should help the UK in its negotiations with other countries to put in place new access 
arrangements to replace those that followed from EU membership. 
 
The longer term prospects are inevitably more speculative but insights drawn from our 
current understanding of law and politics of EU and international financial regulation can 
help to give an informed view on whether the UK is destined to be forever bound to being in 
lockstep with the EU.  First, we can be sure that financial regulation and financial markets 
will continue to co-evolve.100 Notwithstanding the massive post-crisis reform efforts, new 
vulnerabilities will emerge in the financial system (there is evidence of this already 
happening101), and there will be new opportunities as well; the financial regulatory system 
exists in a state of permanent adaptation to this changing external environment. Secondly, 
with some confidence we can discount the likelihood of fundamental disagreement between 
the UK and the EU on the broad parameters of financial regulatory policy.  Brexit comes 
after a period of high political saliency around the capacity of interconnected financial 
markets to contaminate each other, which has propelled a significant degree of international 
regulatory convergence through standard-setting bodies such as the Basel Committee and 
IOSCO, greater emphasis on major economies leading by example in the implementation of 
international standards and more transparency around the results of compliance 
assessments.102  In Part III, it was argued that Brexit by itself will not cause the EU to turn its 
                                                     
100 Simon Deakin, ‘The Evolution of Theory and Method in Law and Finance’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilís Ferran 
and Jennifer Payne, The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP 2015).  
101 Mark Carney, Letter to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 19 July 2016, www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/FSB-Chair-letter-to-G20-Ministers-and-Governors-July-2016.pdf accessed 21 December 2016. 
102 Financial Stability Board, Implementation and Effects of the G20 Regulatory Reforms (November 2015). 
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back on the G20-led reforms aimed at “fixing the fault lines that led to the global financial 
crisis”.103  Exactly the same can also be said of the UK. The collective interests of both the 
EU and UK depend on a well-functioning international regulatory system, which they can 
each influence (the UK may have more opportunity in this regard once free of the constraints 
of being a Member State and thus able more easily to participate in coalitions with other third 
countries to shape the terms on which global finance is conducted104) but not dictate. 
 
To some degree all countries experience a loss of regulatory sovereignty as international 
financial regulation gathers strength.105 The disincentives to change this are strong.  The crux 
of the “taking back control” issue, then, is the scope for the UK in the years after Brexit to 
write its own rules (and to design its own system for oversight and enforcement) within the 
bounded space left by the framework of international financial regulation and also without 
impairing EU equivalence. International standards tend to operate at a sufficiently high level 
of generality to leave room for adaptation to local circumstances.106  Leaving this room for 
manoeuvre has been a significant factor in the success of the “soft law” system for 
international financial standards but its downside is that when it comes to the granularity of 
                                                     
103 Ibid, 5. 
104 But see Moloney, ‘International Financial Governance’ (n 16), on the loss of channels of international 
influence post-Brexit. 
105 Scott Farrell, ‘Sovereignty Lost. The Impact of an Imperfect Federation of International Financial Markets 
Law’ (2013) 28 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 479 (with particular reference to 
Australia).  
106 Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule-making in the 21st Century (2nd  edn, CUP 
2015); Pierre-Henri Conac, The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora Paper 6: The IOSCO 
(IP/A/ECON/2014-15; PE542.195, July 2015)  
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an equivalence assessment the systems in question can look quite different notwithstanding 
that they share the common core of a relevant international standard. Even with a 
commitment to substantive outcomes rather than identical wording, this divergence can hold 
up the equivalence determination process quite significantly, as demonstrated by the US-EU 
lengthy negotiations on CCPs, where the legislative frameworks in question implemented an 
agenda that had been agreed at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009.  
 
Like any other country, the UK will want to fine tune international standards so that they sit 
comfortably with local circumstances and to select the implementation options that are best 
aligned with its global competitiveness agenda. But unlike any other country, it will also have 
to contend with the path dependencies resulting from its past EU membership. Barring a turn 
to highly protectionist EU policies that would make the cost of doing business in Europe 
prohibitive, the legacy of the past can be expected to hang over UK policy to some extent and 
to engender an approach that continues to be characterized by caution and pragmatism.  
Nevertheless, there are factors that point to the UK being able to exert a degree of leadership 
in regulatory design in the longer term, particularly as the focus shifts from whether to re-
open past issues to finding solutions to new problems.  
 
3. Regulatory innovation and competition in the longer term 
 
Three ways for the post Brexit UK to carve a distinctive regulatory path within the bounds of 
international standards and equivalence can be identified. The first relates to “super-
equivalence” – that is going above and beyond what is required by standards and EU law. 
Super-equivalence (also known as gold plating) is not an issue so far as international 
standards are concerned, but EU financial regulation has increasingly taken the form of full 
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or maximum harmonization measures beyond which Member States are not permitted to go. 
The point has particular significance for prudential regulation where the UK’s wish to retain 
the power to impose higher capital charges was a source of some tension within EU processes 
in the recent past.107 The inconsistencies in the equivalence tests adopted in EU instruments 
extend to whether the third country requirements must be “equivalent” or “at least 
equivalent”; whether or not this reflects deliberate choice is debatable.108  Where the relevant 
test is “at least”, it should not be possible for the UK to fail the test by being super-
equivalent. The position with respect to a straight equivalence test may be less clear. 
However, to reach the conclusion that super-equivalence does not satisfy a straight 
equivalence standard would, it is suggested, strain the credibility of commitments to avoid 
legalism. Admittedly aggressive super-equivalence might make it hard for the UK to satisfy 
itself that EU regulation meets its standards, which would have implications for two-way 
access based on reciprocity of treatment, but super-equivalence is any event bounded by 
international competitiveness considerations and within these bounds the reciprocity 
implications of super-equivalence should be manageable.  
 
The second possibility for the UK to put its own stamp on financial regulation post-Brexit is 
through the development of parallel regulatory requirements that allow businesses to choose 
whether or not to be regulated by an EU-equivalent regime. Jersey has been in the vanguard 
in using regulatory optionality as a strategic response to post-crisis EU financial regulation, 
and it now maintains one alternative fund management regime that is designed to mirror the 
                                                     
107 Ferran, ‘Crisis-driven Regulatory Reform’ (n 16) 42-43. 
108 Compare, e.g., CRD, art 55 (professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent) and CRD, art 116(6) 
(confidentiality requirements that are equivalent). 
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EU AIFMD and another that is designed for activity outside the EU.109 Guernsey also has an 
AIFMD parallel regime,110 and Bermuda and the Cayman Islands are going in the same 
direction.  ESMA’s broadly positive advice on Jersey and Guernsey for AIFMD purposes is a 
clear signal that a degree of optionality in a third country’s regulatory system is not 
unacceptable in principle to EU bodies charged with determining equivalence.  
 
As well as following the Jersey/Guernsey lead in the AIFMD context, the possibility of 
parallel regimes for MiFIDII/MiFIR purposes has also been mooted as a post Brexit option 
for the UK.111 For this to work from an equivalence angle would require the European 
Commission, advised by ESMA, to be satisfied that the non-EU compliant alternative is not 
material to its evaluation for passporting purposes, that the UK is a country in which firms  
comply  with  legally  binding  prudential and  business conduct requirements which have 
equivalent effect to the relevant EU requirements.112   
 
How attractive it would be to the UK government to offer parallel regimes is an untested 
question. As long as the lessons of the financial crisis – that regulatory fragmentation can 
lead to gaps that result in systemic vulnerabilities – remain in the memory, there is likely to 
be wariness among policymakers about introducing differentiated requirements for fear that 
this could undermine safety. Moreover, the UK would be unlikely to want to put its 
                                                     
109 Relevant information on the Jersey Financial Services Commission webpage at 
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credibility within international standard-setting bodies that aim at regulatory convergence at 
risk by an ill-judged venture into extensive optionality. And unless a particular alternative 
non-EU compliant regime is intended to cater for purely domestic business, the UK would 
still need to consider compatibility with other third country standards to ensure that the 
regime offers users sufficient access to global international (non-EU) markets to be attractive 
to an international clientele. The multilevel relationships that sit behind the regulation of 
international finance form a complex and sticky web from which advanced economic powers 
effectively cannot break free: they are condemned to cooperate and to refrain from an over-
aggressive strategy around regulatory export.113  
 
The development of parallel regimes would take the UK into the realm of engaging in 
regulatory competition with the EU, but for reasons mentioned immediately above, this 
would likely be possible only under rather limited conditions. There is heated debate in the 
academic literature for and against regulatory competition, but a small amount of competition 
between the UK and EU in targeted areas of financial regulation is unlikely to be harmful, 
and could be beneficial. One of the advantages claimed for regulatory competition is that it 
can expose bureaucratic error. With that thought in mind, it is interesting to note that it is 
against the AIFMD, widely regarded as a low point of the EU’s post-crisis regulatory 
response, where competition in the form of parallel regimes is flourishing. This may not be 
coincidental.  
 
Finally, and probably the strongest point in support of the UK being able to break free of the 
detail of EU law in the longer term (whilst remaining equivalent) lies in the deep skill and 
expertise in financial regulation that the UK enjoys and the opportunities afforded by a 
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dynamic regulatory field that exists in a permanent state of adaptation to put that expertise to 
use in driving regulatory innovation. As an EU Member State, this concentrated expertise 
enabled the UK to exert considerable influence over the design of EU regulation. Moreover, 
on certain matters – bank resolution and bank structural reform being two prominent 
examples – it was ahead of the EU in the adoption of regulatory reform. As a Member State, 
the UK might sometimes have held back from anticipating  possible EU level intervention so 
as not to prolong disruption and add to adaptation/compliance costs. Since that consideration 
will no longer apply, Brexit may enhance the UK’s “first mover” capabilities, and, in turn, 
help to enable the UK to set the agenda for equivalence negotiations with the EU.  
 
 
PART V: CONCLUSION 
 
A unified Union approach to the treatment of third countries based on the concept of 
equivalence is not yet in place. This paper has examined the approach to third counties in EU 
banking and markets regulation to reveal a complex, but dynamic, situation. As a Member 
State the UK did not support the exclusive adoption of EU-led equivalence as the conceptual 
basis for third country matters because of concerns that this would threaten the openness of 
London as an international financial centre. Paradoxically, having been reluctant as a 
Member State to support a unified EU system for the treatment of third countries, in a hard 
Brexit scenario the UK may come to welcome an accelerated shift by the EU towards 
precisely such a system, provided it does not become a vehicle for protectionist policies.  
 
Drawing on the scholarly analysis of the law and politics of EU and international financial 
regulation to date, this paper has found that Brexit is likely to smooth the progression towards 
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a more unified EU system for the treatment of third countries. It has identified three powerful 
reasons to doubt whether this will prompt an inward turn in EU international relations: the 
EU’s economic self-interest in remaining an internationally open financial market; the EU’s 
political agenda to play an influential part in shaping international financial regulation; and 
the growing capacity of the technocratic ESAs in the equivalence sphere. The paper has 
maintained that since the UK is also deeply committed to the G20 agenda for international 
financial regulation, there is unlikely to be fundamental disagreement between the UK and 
the EU on the broad parameters of financial regulatory policy but, also, that experience shows 
that the common core of a relevant international standard does not guarantee a smooth ride 
when it comes to equivalence determinations. Drawing on current scholarship but looking 
ahead to an unprecedented situation, this study has argued that the UK will face a unique 
problem in dealing with the EU on equivalence in the short term because whereas for 
“ordinary” third countries, the question is whether the systems have converged sufficiently to 
be considered equivalent, in the case of the UK as a former Member State third country, the 
question will be whether it remains equivalent in spite of the extent to which its system has 
started to diverge from the EU approach. The potentially destabilizing consequences of 
disturbing the status quo can be expected to weaken the UK’s negotiating position vis-a-vis 
the EU and point to a strategy in the short term of maintaining a domestic framework that is 
close to   EU law.  
 
Longer term, there are three possibilities for the Brexiteers’ campaign slogan to “take back 
control” to acquire real meaning in the financial services area. First, being “super-equivalent” 
should become easier – though the UK’s global competitiveness agenda should temper 
pursuit of super-equivalence as a policy goal. Secondly, there is scope to develop parallel 
regimes in certain areas, one EU-compliant, one not, to cater for different constituencies – 
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though this too is subject to a counterbalancing force in the form of the danger that becoming 
known as the supplier of a proliferation of alternative regimes, which could undermine the 
UK as a credible voice in the international standard-setting fora that aim at regulatory 
convergence. Thirdly, Brexit should enhance the UK’s capacity to use its expertise in 
financial regulation to be the “first mover” in finding solutions to new regulatory problems.  
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